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classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli 
are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. in contrast to these clas-
sical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of 
task-congruent processing pathways and propose an attentional sensitization model of uncon-
scious visual processing: According to this model, unconscious visual processing is automatic in 
the sense that it is initiated without deliberate intention. however, unconscious visual process-
ing is susceptible to attentional top-down control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is  
configured accordingly. in this article, we describe our attentional sensitization model and review 
recent evidence demonstrating attentional influences on subliminal priming, a prototypical exam-
ple of an automatic process. we show that subliminal priming (a) depends on attentional resources, 
(b) is susceptible to stimulus expectations, (c) is influenced by action intentions, and (d) is modu-
lated by task sets. these data suggest that attention enhances or attenuates unconscious visual 
processes in congruency with attentional task representations similar to conscious perception. we 
argue that seemingly paradoxical, hitherto unexplained findings regarding the automaticity of the 
underlying processes in many cognitive domains can be easily accommodated by our attentional 
sensitization model. we conclude this review with a discussion of future research questions regar-
ding the nature of attentional control of unconscious visual processing.
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IntroductIon
Unconscious  automatic  processes  are  traditionally  thought  to  oc-
cur autonomously and independently of top-down control (Posner 
& Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). According to classical 
theories, automatic processes (a) are independent of capacity-limited 
attentional resources, (b) are not prone to interference from other 
processes, (c) can act in parallel, and (d) are unconscious (Posner & 
Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). Top-down control by atten-
tion, action goals, and task sets is assumed to be restricted to processes 
that are conscious.
Although lacking direct empirical support, this classical view is 
implicit in current theorizing about automaticity and strongly influ-
ences contemporary conceptions of cognitive control: Based upon the 
assumption that automatic processes are autonomous, a behavioral or 
neurophysiological effect has to be invariant in order to index a “truly 
automatic” process (Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2003). Such opera-
tional definitions of automaticity, which are essentially influenced by 
the classical view, can be found in many areas of psychology and neu-
roscience such as in object or face recognition (e.g., Pessoa, McKenna, 
Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; Wiese, Schweinberger, & Neumann, 
2008), action preparation (e.g., Bub & Masson, 2010), and emotional AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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processing (e.g., Pessoa et al., 2002). Given that attention and task de-
mands are frequently found to modulate behavioral and neurophysi-
ological effects, it is difficult to identify processes that actually meet 
the classical criteria for automaticity. The apparent lack of processes 
that fully meet the criteria of automaticity renders the classical view 
of automaticity unsatisfactory (see also Moors & De Houwer, 2006). 
Furthermore, the classical stance of automaticity implies a considerable 
inflexibility of the cognitive system: Conscious goal-directed informa-
tion processing would be massively influenced by various unconscious 
processes.  Such  inflexibility  would  place  tremendous  demands  on 
conscious control, because the intended action could only be ensured 
by inhibiting numerous interfering response tendencies (Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001).
A number of recently refined theories of automaticity allows for 
more  flexibility  and  adaptability  of  automatic  processing  and  un-
conscious cognition (Kiefer, 2007; Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Moors & 
De Houwer, 2006; Naccache, Blandin, & Dehaene, 2002; Neumann, 
1990). These theories converge on the assumption that the cognitive 
system has to be configured by attention and task sets in order for 
automatic processes to occur. For instance, the theory of direct para-
meter specification (DPS) by Neumann (1990) posits that unconscious 
information will only be processed and influence the motor response 
to a target stimulus to the extent that it matches current intentions. 
Unlike classical theories, refined theories assume that automatic proc-
esses are critically dependent on higher-level, top-down factors such 
as attention, intentions, and task sets that orchestrate the processing 
streams toward greater optimization of task performance. Given this 
dependency  on  the  precise  configuration  of  the  cognitive  system, 
one  might  as  well  speak  of  conditional  automaticity ( Bargh,  1989;   
Logan, 1989).
Subliminal priming by masked 
stimuli
Typical examples of unconscious automatic processes are subliminal 
priming  (e.g.,  facilitatory)  effects  elicited  by  masked  visual  stimuli 
that are not consciously perceived. Different forms of priming can be 
distinguished, depending on the relation between prime and target 
(Kiefer, 2007). Masked visuo-motor response priming denotes faster 
responses to visual shape targets, when the masked prime (also a visual 
shape) indicates the same rather than a different response (Ansorge & 
Neumann, 2005; Vorberg, Mattler, Heinecke, Schmidt, & Schwarzbach, 
2003). This form of priming depends on visuo-motor processes giving 
rise to response conflict. Masked semantic priming, in contrast, reflects 
access to word meaning (Carr & Dagenbach, 1990; Kiefer, 2002; Kiefer 
& Spitzer, 2000). It denotes facilitation of a response to a target word, 
when it is preceded by a semantically related masked prime word (e.g., 
chair-table). In line with the assumption that priming is mediated by 
different processes, different forms of priming activate distinct brain 
regions: Visuo-motor response priming recruits occipito-parietal areas 
(Wolbers et al., 2006) known to be involved in visual form processing 
(ventral pathway) as well as in object grasping and motor preparation 
(dorsal  pathway).  Semantic  priming  depends  on  anterior  temporal 
areas (ventral pathways) supporting semantic integration (Kiefer & 
Pulvermüller, 2011; Nobre & McCarthy, 1995). 
As a complement to behavioral priming effects, event-related po-
tentials (ERPs) recorded from the scalp capture task-specific priming 
processes on-line during task performance. Semantic priming modu-
lates the N400 ERP component, a negative deflection peaking at about 
400 ms with a centro-parietal topography (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). The 
N400 semantic priming effect is reflected by an attenuated N400 ampli-
tude (i.e., relatively less negative voltage) to a target when preceded by 
a semantically related as compared with an unrelated prime (Bentin, 
McCarthy, & Wood, 1985; Kiefer, Weisbrod, Kern, Maier, & Spitzer, 
1998). Intracranial ERP recordings (Nobre & McCarthy, 1995) and 
source analyses of scalp potentials (Kiefer, Schuch, Schenck, & Fiedler, 
2007) have implicated a region in the anterior-medial temporal lobe in 
generating the N400 ERP component. Visuo-motor response priming, 
in contrast, modulates ERPs over the occipito-parietal scalp in a time 
window between 200-400 ms (Jaśkowski, Skalska, & Verleger, 2003; 
Martens, Ansorge, & Kiefer 2011). These ERPs most likely arise from 
the parietal visuo-motor system as identified in a previous functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study (Wolbers et al., 2006). In 
contrast to behavioral measures, which reflect the output of the entire 
processing chain, ERPs have the advantage of directly capturing cogni-
tive processes online during task performance.
Before we review the latest findings demonstrating attentional in-
fluences on subliminal priming as an example of an automatic process, 
we introduce our theoretical view of attentional control of unconscious 
visual processing in the next section.
the attentIonal sensItIzatIon 
model for top-down control  
of unconscIous cognItIon
Although refined theories of automaticity converge on the assumption 
that automatic processes are susceptible to top-down control, there is 
as yet no general theoretical framework that accounts for a number 
of  top-down  factors  and  different  forms  of  automatic  processes. 
We  have  therefore  recently  developed  the  attentional  sensitization 
model of unconscious cognition (Kiefer & Martens, 2010) that aims 
at explaining the various influences of top-down attention on different 
forms of unconscious automatic processing. According to this model, 
attentional influences originating from task sets enhance task-relevant 
unconscious processes while attenuating task-irrelevant unconscious 
processes. Much as conscious perception is influenced by attentional 
mechanisms, unconscious cognition is assumed to be controlled by 
top-down signals from prefrontal cortex (Haynes et al., 2007) that 
increase or decrease the sensitivity of processing pathways for incom-
ing sensory input (Bode & Haynes, 2008; Hopfinger, Buonocore, & 
Mangun,  2000;  Hopfinger,  Woldorff,  Fletcher,  &  Mangun,  2001). 
Processing in task-relevant pathways is enhanced by increasing the 
gain of the neurons in the corresponding areas, whereas processing 
in task-irrelevant pathways is attenuated by a decrease of the gain 
(Reynolds, Pasternak, & Desimone, 2000). Gain is a parameter in neu-AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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ral network modeling, which influences the probability that a neuron 
fires at a given activation level (Hamker, 2005). Single cell recordings 
in non-human primates have shown that the likelihood of a neuron 
firing, given a constant sensory input, is enhanced when the stimulus 
dimension that is preferentially processed by the neuron is attended 
to (e.g., Treue & Martínez-Trujillo, 1999). We thus assume that an 
attentional sensitizing mechanism gradually enhances and attenuates 
stimulus processing irrespective of whether the stimulus is consciously 
perceived or not (Kiefer & Martens, 2010).
The  attentional  sensitization  model  suggests  that,  in  a  manner 
similar to controlled processes, automatic processes (a) should depend 
on available attentional resources, and (b) are susceptible to top-down 
control by currently active task representations. Attentional sensitiza-
tion of automatic processing by task representations is achieved by 
enhancing the sensitivity of task-relevant pathways and by attenuating 
the sensitivity of task-irrelevant pathways. 
Although attentional top-down control of both unconscious and 
conscious cognition shares basic computational principles, top-down 
control for conscious processing is more flexible. For this reason, we 
distinguish between preemptive and reactive control (Ansorge, Fuchs, 
Khalid, & Kunde, 2011; Ansorge & Horstmann, 2007; Ansorge, Kiss, 
& Eimer, 2009; Kiefer, 2007; Kiefer & Martens, 2010). In preemptive 
control, top-down influences are initiated in advance of stimulus pre-
sentation. Preemptive control can be exerted for both conscious and 
unconscious stimulus presentation, whereas only consciously perceived 
stimuli are susceptible to reactive control in response to ongoing or 
completed stimulus processing. For that reason, subliminal informa-
tion cannot be used for determining further strategic processing steps 
in a deliberate fashion (Merikle, Joordens, & Stolz, 1995). This means 
that top-down control of unconscious cognition must occur implicitly 
on the grounds of currently activated action goals or the consciously 
perceived outcome of overt behavior. As a consequence, intentional 
application of control and on-line modification is restricted to con-
scious processes (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 
2006).  Finally,  attentional  influences  on  unconscious  cognition  are 
presumably facilitatory, that is, they depend on differential attentional 
sensitization,  whereas  active  inhibition  of  task-irrelevant  informa-
tion appears to be confined to controlled processing of consciously 
perceived stimuli (Merikle et al., 1995; Neely, 1977; Posner & Snyder, 
1975). Thus, according to the attentional sensitization model (Kiefer 
& Martens, 2010), conscious “strategic” stimulus processing allows for 
a greater adaptability and flexibility of top-down control than “auto-
matic” processing under unconscious viewing conditions.
In the upcoming two parts of this article, we will review latest 
evidence demonstrating a variety of attentional influences on several 
forms of unconscious priming. In the next section, we describe find-
ings that support our notion of attentional sensitization of unconscious 
visual processing although these studies were not specifically designed 
to test our model. Empirical work that specifically aims at testing the 
attentional sensitization model using the induction task paradigm is 
discussed in detail in the subsequent section, Specifying attentional 
influences on subliminal priming with the induction task paradigm.
attentIonal Influences  
on sublImInal prImIng
Although the classical view of automaticity is prevailing and still domi-
nates current research, evidence for attentional top-down control of 
unconscious visual processing has been accumulated during the last 
years. Several attentional manipulations have been shown to reliably 
modulate subliminal priming effects. This highlights the generality 
and robustness of attentional effects on unconscious visual process-
ing. In this section, we review findings from studies demonstrating 
that subliminal priming (a) depends on attentional resources, (b) is 
susceptible to stimulus expectations, and (c) is influenced by action   
intentions.
Influence of attentional resources
Unconscious priming has been shown to depend on attentional top-
down  amplification  and  attentional  resources  similar  to  conscious   
visual  perception:  In  a  masked  semantic  priming  study  (Kiefer  & 
Brendel, 2006), an attentional cue was presented that prompted partici-
pants to attend to the stimulation stream either during the time win-
dow of masked prime presentation or already 1 s earlier. In the latter 
long cue-prime interval condition, subjects disengaged attention when 
the masked prime was finally presented. Kiefer and Brendel obtained a 
semantic priming effect on the N400 ERP component, but only when 
the masked prime was presented within the time window of attention. 
In a similar study, masked response priming was only obtained when 
the onset of the prime-target pairs was temporally predictable and 
therefore attended to (Naccache et al., 2002). Furthermore, masked 
semantic priming was significantly reduced when the masked prime 
was preceded by a difficult task requiring greater attentional resources 
compared with an attentionally undemanding task (Martens & Kiefer, 
2009). In addition to temporal attention and attentional resources, 
unconscious visual processing depends on spatial attention: In patients 
with blindsight, spatial cueing was found to improve discrimination 
performance without awareness (Kentridge, Heywood, & Weiskrantz, 
1999,  2004)  suggesting  that  unconscious  visual  processing  benefits 
from spatial attentional amplification comparable to conscious visual 
perception (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). These findings are in 
line with our proposal (Kiefer & Martens, 2010) that attention and 
conscious experience are functionally independent to some extent and 
should not be equated (see also Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; Van Boxtel, 
Tsuchiya, & Koch, 2010).
Influence of stimulus expectations
Subliminal  processing  of  stimuli  strongly  depends  on  stimulus 
expectations  that  include  what  kind  of  stimulus  is  likely  to  occur 
within a given situation. Expected subliminal stimuli receive atten-
tional  amplification  and  are  further  processed  whereas  processing 
of unexpected stimuli is attenuated (Eckstein & Perrig, 2007; Kiesel, 
Kunde, Pohl, Berner, & Hoffmann, 2009; Kunde, Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 
2003). Of course, these attentional expectations cannot be established 
by  unconsciously  presented  stimuli  themselves,  but  are  formed  by   AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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consciously  perceived  stimuli  presented  in  a  specific  situation,  for 
instance, by the visible target stimuli of a priming paradigm. It has 
been shown that the nature of visible target stimuli included in an 
experiment  strongly  influences  subliminal  priming  effects.  This 
phenomenon has been mostly shown within the domain of response 
priming: Masked stimuli prime responses only if they are expected and 
represent possible release conditions for prepared actions to the visible 
targets (Eckstein & Perrig, 2007; Kiesel et al., 2009; Kunde et al., 2003). 
For  instance,  subliminal  response  priming  effects  elicited  by  novel 
primes, which are not presented as targets, are only obtained when 
they belong to or are at least similar to the attentional set established 
by the visible targets. Kunde and colleagues (2003) showed that sub-
liminally presented numbers prime numerical categorizations of vis-
ible numbers only when they are located within the magnitude space 
spanned by the visible targets (e.g., the prime numbers “2” and “3” are 
within the magnitude space spanned by the visible targets “1” and “4”),   
but not when they are outside the magnitude space spanned by the 
visible targets (e.g., the prime numbers “1” and “2” are outside the 
magnitude space spanned by the visible targets “3” and “4”). Similar 
expectancy effects on response priming have been observed for ver-
bal stimuli within a semantic categorization task when the target set 
size was manipulated (Kiesel, Kunde, Pohl, & Hoffmann, 2006). In 
one condition, target set size was large (40 targets) so that a variety of 
words from different semantic categories was expected. In the other 
condition, target set size was small (four targets) so that attention could 
be focused on a narrow set of stimuli. In line with the assumption that 
stimulus  expectations  influence  processing  of  subliminal  informa-
tion, response priming for novel subliminal prime words was only 
obtained for the large, but not for the small target set. These findings 
demonstrate that the content of an attentional set establishes stimulus 
expectations that sensitize processing pathways for expected stimuli 
even when they remain unconscious. As a result, these expected sub-
liminal stimuli elicit priming effects. In a similar vein, stimulus expec-
tations that are based on image statistics associated with specific object 
categories (such as animals vs. tools) can influence unconscious gaze   
control  (Li,  VanRullen,  Koch,  &  Perona,  2002;  Torralba  &  Oliva, 
2003).
Influence of action intentions
Masked response priming has been shown to depend on action inten-
tions: Ansorge and colleagues (Ansorge, Heumann, & Scharlau, 2002; 
Ansorge  &  Neumann,  2005)  found  that  unconsciously  perceived 
masked primes trigger responses only if they are congruent with the 
current intentions of a person. Response priming effects were abo-
lished when task instructions were changed in such a way that primes 
ceased to be task-relevant. For instance, primes and targets with a 
similar shape elicited subliminal response priming effects (i.e. faster 
response for primes and targets with similar shapes) only when the re-
sponse decision was based on the target’s shape (Ansorge & Neumann, 
2005). However, when the instruction of the target task was changed 
such that the response decision was based on the target’s color, re-
sponse priming effects disappeared although primes and targets still 
exhibited similar or dissimilar shapes (Ansorge & Neumann, 2005). 
In a comparable experiment, shape or color congruency of masked 
primes and visible targets only primed target responses, when the cor-
responding prime feature (e.g., shape during shape decisions on the 
target) was relevant in the target task (Tapia, Breitmeyer, & Shooner, 
2010). The task-irrelevant prime feature did not influence responses to   
targets.
In a continuation of this line of research, the capture of visuo-
spatial attention by unconscious stimuli likewise was shown to depend 
on the match between stimulus features and a top-down search tem-
plate directed towards the task-relevant visual features of the targets 
(Ansorge,  Horstmann,  &  Worschech,  2010;  Ansorge  et  al.,  2009; 
Held,  Ansorge,  &  Müller,  2010).  Top-down  effects  on  attentional 
capture by unconscious stimuli were discussed in detail by Ansorge, 
Horstmann,  and  Scharlau  (2011)  and  by  Reuss,  Pohl,  Kiesel,  and   
Kunde (2011).
Modulatory effects of action intentions have also been observed 
on subliminal processing of semantic word meaning: During seman-
tic  categorizations  of  target  words  (evaluative  valence  decision  vs. 
animacy decision), affective (positive vs. negative valence) or animacy 
(living vs. non-living) congruency of preceding subliminally presented 
prime words elicited only priming effects on the target decision when 
the corresponding meaning dimension was also task-relevant in the 
target task (Eckstein & Perrig, 2007). Similarly, spatial congruency of 
prime and target words indicating either an elevated (e.g., above) or 
a lowered location (e.g., below) produced priming effects only dur-
ing a spatial target task, but not during a target task with numbers of 
high and low numerical magnitude (Ansorge, Kiefer, Khalid, Grassl, 
& König, 2010). These findings suggest that action intentions sensi-
tize congruent and desensitize incongruent unconscious processing 
pathways: We propose that an attentional top-down signal enhances 
unconscious processing of the stimulus dimension that matches the 
current  intention.  This  attentional  sensitization  mechanism  results 
in subliminal priming effects on responses to visible targets only for 
stimulus dimensions that are congruent with the current action inten-
tion. Although action intentions apparently attenuate the processing 
of task-irrelevant subliminal information, this does not preclude the 
possibility that task-irrelevant stimulus dimensions can involuntarily 
influence task-relevant responses when they partially match with the 
action intention and thus belong to the currently active task set to 
some extent. Such phenomena are typically observed in interference 
paradigms with visible stimuli. For instance, naming the ink color of 
a color word in the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) receives interference by 
the irrelevant meaning of the color word. Similarly, classification reac-
tions with the left or right hands to visual stimuli are influenced by 
their irrelevant spatial position as observed in the Simon task (Simon, 
1990). Interestingly, in line with our attentional sensitization model, 
these interference effects reflecting automatic processing of irrelevant 
stimulus dimension can be abolished if the attentional set is changed 
such that the partial match of the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension 
with the current action intention is removed (Raz, Kirsch, Pollard, & 
Nitkin-Kaner, 2006).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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specIfyIng attentIonal Influences 
on sublImInal prImIng  
wIth the InductIon task paradIgm
Unconscious priming does not only depend on action intentions, but 
also on task sets, which are active during the presentation of the masked 
prime (Kiefer, 2007; Kiefer & Martens, 2010; Martens et al., 2011). 
Similar to intentions, task sets are assumed to trigger an attentional 
sensitization mechanism that enhances processes in task-congruent 
pathways while attenuating task-incongruent processes. In this section, 
we review results of recent studies with the induction task paradigm 
that allows specifying attentional influences originating from task sets 
on various forms of unconscious visual processing at a fine-grained 
level. The induction task paradigm has been developed to test specific 
predictions of the attentional sensitization model, but can be generally 
used to identify the influence of task sets on conscious or unconscious 
visual perception.
In line with earlier proposals (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), we define 
task sets as an adaptive configuration of the cognitive system which 
is necessary to efficiently perform a given task (see also Kiesel et al., 
2010). The concept of task set is related to that of intention, but is 
more specific because it only refers to the immediate computational 
consequences of pursuing a current goal during task performance that 
determine the configuration of the cognitive system. The concept of in-
tention is broader because it additionally includes the conscious repre-
sentation of the goal and the subjective state of commitment to perform 
a goal-related action (Ansorge & Neumann, 2005; Goschke, 2002).
In order to determine attentional top-down influences of task sets 
on unconscious semantic and visuo-motor response priming, we have 
recently developed an induction task paradigm (cf. Figure 1) that ex-
ploits the temporal dynamics of task set activation (Kiefer & Martens, 
2010). Consider a scenario in which the subject needs to perform two 
tasks in quick succession, the second task being a subliminally primed 
decision task preceded by a semantic or a perceptual classification 
task. According to the attentional sensitization model, these previously 
performed tasks should differentially influence the subsequent masked 
priming effect (Kiefer & Martens, 2010).
In  our  induction  task  paradigm,  prior  to  the  masked  priming 
procedure, participants were engaged in different induction tasks (e.g., 
semantic classification vs. perceptual classification) designed to induce 
a specific task set (e.g., semantic or perceptual task set). The different 
induction tasks were presented in separate blocks in order to avoid 
task switching effects between trials with different induction tasks. The 
induction tasks were followed immediately by a primed decision task 
(e.g., lexical decision for semantic priming or shape decision for visuo-
motor priming). Across experiments, we systematically varied the type 
of induction task to specify the attentional mechanisms which enhance 
or attenuate unconscious processing. According to the proposed atten-
tional sensitization model, task representations enhance and attenuate 
processing streams in order to facilitate processing in congruency with 
higher-level goals: Automatic processes that match task representa-
tions are assumed to be amplified, while other automatic processes 
should be attenuated.
Influence of perceptual  
and semantic induction tasks  
on subliminal semantic  
and visuo-motor priming
Using the induction task paradigm, we systematically investigated the 
influence of previously performed tasks on subsequent masked seman-
tic priming within a lexical decision task (word/non-word decision) 
in three experiments (Kiefer & Martens, 2010). We asked whether a 
semantic task set induced by a semantic decision task (induction task) 
immediately  before  masked  prime  presentation  sensitizes  semantic 
processing pathways and enhances subliminal semantic priming. In 
contrast, a perceptual task set induced by a task that requires atten-
tion to visual stimulus features was assumed to desensitize semantic 
pathways and therefore to attenuate subsequent subliminal semantic 
priming. We varied the time interval (either 200 or 800 ms) between 
the response to the induction task and the onset of the prime (RPI) in 
order to obtain information on how the influence of the induction task 
on masked priming unfolds over time. We expected that a semantic 
induction task would sensitize semantic processing pathways and thus 
would enhance semantic priming only at the short RPI (200 ms) be-
cause the task switching literature suggests that a task representation 
is active for about 600 ms after task completion (Rogers & Monsell, 
1995), but is actively inhibited thereafter (Mayr & Keele, 2000). In all 
experiments, subliminal priming effects were assessed with behavioral 
(shorter reaction time [RT] to semantically related than to unrelated 
prime target pairs) and ERP measures (larger amplitude of the N400 
ERP component, an electrophysiological index of semantic processing, 
for semantically unrelated than for related prime-target pairs).
Across experiments, the difficulty of the semantic and perceptual 
induction tasks as well as their verbal or non-verbal nature was sys-
tematically varied. In Experiment 1, participants performed an easy 
semantic word classification task (living/non-living decision) and a dif-
ficult perceptual letter classification task with words (deciding whether 
first or last letter of a word has a closed or open shape). In Experi- 
ment 2, the difficulty of the induction tasks was reversed: difficult 
semantic word classification (deciding whether a word refers to some-
thing dry or wet) versus easy perceptual letter classification (deciding 
whether first or last letter of a word is the letter t). In Experiment 3, 
non-verbal induction tasks had the same level of difficulty: semantic 
classification (living/non-living decision) versus perceptual classifica-
tion of object pictures (round vs. elongated shape decision). At the 
short RPI, semantic priming effects on RT and N400 ERP component 
were obtained when a semantic task set was induced immediately 
before subliminal prime presentation, whereas a previously induced 
perceptual task set attenuated priming.
Comparable results were obtained regardless of the difficulty level 
and the verbal or non-verbal nature of the induction tasks. In line with 
the attentional sensitization model, unconscious semantic processing 
is enhanced by a semantic task set and attenuated by a perceptual task 
set. At the long RPI, significant priming was found after the perceptual 
induction task, but not after the semantic task. The priming effects at 
the long RPI suggest that after 800 ms, the task set of the induction AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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task was abandoned and a reconfiguration of the cognitive system in 
preparation for the upcoming lexical task took place (Kiefer & Martens, 
2010): Semantic pathways are sensitized when the perceptual induction 
task had been abandoned, but they are desensitized when the semantic 
induction task had been abandoned. This result pattern is compatible 
with the notion of a backward inhibition mechanism that suppresses ir-
relevant task sets in preparation of the next task (Houghton, Pritchard, 
& Grange, 2009; Mayr & Keele, 2000). The differential modulatory ef-
fects of induction tasks on masked priming provide a window to the 
dynamic nature of cognitive reorganization that takes place during task 
set switching that in turn influences top-down control of unconscious 
cognition.
In the second study (Martens et al., 2011), we contrasted in two 
experiments the influence of a perceptual (round vs. elongated object 
classification) with that of a semantic induction task (living vs. non-
living object classification) on masked semantic word priming and 
visuo-motor response priming of geometrical target shapes. In the 
visuo-motor priming task, participants performed right or left hand 
responses to discriminate between geometrical target shapes (e.g., cir-
cle or square). The visible target was preceded by a masked prime that 
indicated either the same or a different motor response, but was never 
combined with the identical shape to avoid repetition effects. In con-
trast to semantic priming, visuo-motor response priming modulates 
occipito-parietal ERP components between 200-500 ms (Jaśkowski et 
Figure 1.
temporal sequence of one trial in the semantic and perceptual induction task conditions. the masked prime word was presen-
ted either 200 ms or 800 ms following the response to the induction task (response stimulus interval, rPi) that is intended to elicit  
the corresponding task set. the semantic induction task required semantic classification (forced choice living/non-living decision) to 
the inducing word, whereas the perceptual induction task required a forced choice perceptual classification decision of the first and 
the last letter (open/closed shape) of the inducing word. Modified after “Attentional sensitization of Unconscious cognition: task sets 
Modulate subsequent Masked semantic Priming” by M. Kiefer and U. Martens (2010), Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 139, 
pp. 464-489.
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al., 2003). The attentional sensitization model predicts that perceptual 
and semantic induction tasks differentially influence these two forms 
of subliminal priming. In line with our attentional sensitization model 
(Kiefer & Martens, 2010), behavioral and electrophysiological effects 
showed a differential modulation of subliminal priming by the induc-
tion  tasks:  As  in  the  previous  experiments,  semantic  priming  was 
found following the semantic but not following the perceptual induc-
tion task. Visuo-motor priming, depending on access to visual shape 
information, was only observed after the perceptual but not after the 
semantic induction task. Hence, unconscious processes in visuo-motor 
and semantic processing streams are coordinated in congruency with 
current task sets.
Determining the attentional 
boundary conditions for subliminal 
semantic and visuo-motor priming
In two further studies, we determined the nature of task sets which 
boost semantic or visuo-motor priming. In the first study (Adams & 
Kiefer, results not published yet), we wanted to better characterize the 
task set that enhances unconscious semantic processing. Previously, 
we found enhanced subliminal semantic priming following a semantic 
word classification task, but reduced priming following a perceptual 
letter classification task (Kiefer & Martens, 2010). Unlike the semantic 
word classification task, the perceptual letter classification task discour-
aged word reading and focused attention to single letters. It is therefore 
an open question whether a phonological task, which involves reading 
processes, suffices to enhance subsequent semantic priming. It has 
been suggested that word reading unintentionally includes semantic 
activation because reading is strongly linked with semantic analysis 
through  numerous  practice  instances  in  natural  reading  situations 
(Posner & Snyder, 1975).
In two experiments, we varied the nature of the phonological in-
duction task (phonological word vs. phonological letter categorization) 
to test the boundary conditions for unconscious semantic processing 
to occur and contrasted them to a semantic induction task. In one 
experiment, we used a phonological induction task that required at-
tention to the entire word and thus could permit word reading (pho-
nological word induction task). We asked whether this non-semantic 
task set permits subsequent subliminal semantic priming. In the word 
induction task, participants had to decide whether words comprised a 
vowel as first or last letter (e.g., autumn, bottle, ocean) or a consonant 
as first and as last letter (e.g., garden, paper). Priming following this 
phonological induction task was compared with a semantic induction 
task, in which words had to be classified according to whether they 
refer to living (e.g., pilot, apple, dog) or non-living objects (e.g., castle, 
pencil, bottle). We found somewhat smaller subliminal priming effects 
following the phonological than the semantic induction task although 
this difference in priming was not significant. In the second experi-
ment, word reading was discouraged in the phonological induction 
task by presenting words with a capital letter at one position (pho-
nological letter induction task). In this induction task, attention was 
allocated to phonological aspects of single letters: Participants had to 
decide whether the capital letter was either a vowel (e.g., jewEl, fAble) 
or a consonant (e.g., oRacle, breaTh). In the semantic induction task, 
participants again performed a semantic classification. In the latter 
experiment, semantic priming effects were only observed following 
the semantic classification, but not following the phonological letter 
classification  induction  task.  The  results  of  these  two  experiments 
show  that  attention  to  single  letters/phonemes  of  a  word  strongly 
disrupts subsequent semantic processing of unconsciously presented 
primes (for similar task effects on visible primes, see Maxfield, 1997). 
An  attentional  orientation  towards  word  phonology  also  reduced 
subsequent subliminal semantic priming, but less pronounced com-
pared with the phonological letter induction task. Dual route models 
of reading (Coltheart, Curtis, Atkins, & Haller, 1993; Seidenberg & 
McClelland, 1989) can account for the less pronounced modulation 
of the subliminal priming effect by the phonological word induction 
task: According to these models, word reading includes both semantic 
and non-semantic pathways. Although reading may include implicit 
access to semantics and can sensitize semantic processing pathways 
as shown by the semantic priming literature (e.g., Neely, 1991), word 
reading may bypass semantics in specific conditions (Coltheart et al., 
1993; Perry, Ziegler, & Zorzi, 2007; Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989). 
The two alternative processing pathways underlying word reading may 
lead to considerable interindividual variability with regard to the spe-
cific nature of the phonological task set activated by the phonological 
word induction task (non-semantic vs. semantic route). This may result 
in a less reliable reduction of subliminal semantic priming compared 
with the phonological letter task, which unequivocally activates a non-
semantic task and thus clearly desensitizes semantic pathways.
In a continuation of this line of research, we were interested in a 
fine-grained analysis of perceptual induction task effects on uncon-
scious visuo-motor response priming. There is evidence that shape and 
color of visible objects can be attended to and processed independently 
of each other (Boucart, Humphreys, & Lorenceau, 1995). Based on 
these findings, we varied the induction task within the perceptual do-
main to further assess whether the proposed attentional sensitization 
mechanism not only distinguishes between broad cognitive domains 
such as visual versus semantic stimulus attributes but also specifically 
sensitizes stimulus attributes within the perceptual domain (Zovko & 
Kiefer, results not published yet). We contrasted the effects of a shape-
decision induction task similar to a previous experiment (Kiefer & 
Martens, 2010) with a novel color-decision task, in which the hue of 
colored object pictures had to be classified (red vs. blue hue). In the 
visuo-motor priming task, participants performed right or left hand 
responses to discriminate between geometrical target shapes (Martens 
et  al.,  2011).  We  found  occipito-parietal  ERP  priming  effects  only 
subsequent to the shape induction task. No such effects were found 
subsequently  to  the  color  induction  task.  These  results  show  that 
attentional  sensitization  of  unconscious  cognition  can  also  occur 
within  perceptual  subdomains,  such  as  shape  and  color  attributes. 
These  attentional  influences  modulate  subliminal  visuo-motor  re-
sponse priming very fine-grained at the level of specific visual object   
features.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology review Article
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These few examples show that the induction task paradigm, com-
bining a task for inducing task sets with a subsequent priming para-
digm, could serve as an important tool for elucidating the attentional 
configuration necessary for certain subliminal processes to occur (e.g., 
semantic or visuo-motor).
attentIonal sensItIzatIon  
of unconscIous vIsual processIng: 
the controlled nature  
of automatIcIty
In  the  previous  sections,  we  have  reviewed  recent  findings  dem-
onstrating  attentional  influences  on  unconscious  visual  process-
ing.  Accumulating  evidence  demonstrates  that  unconscious  visual 
processing is susceptible to attentional control similar to conscious 
visual processing: Subliminal priming effects, prototypical examples of 
automatic processes, are modulated by attentional resources, stimulus 
expectations, action intentions, and task sets. Hence, in contrast to 
classical theories of automaticity (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider 
& Shiffrin, 1977), automatic processes elicited by unconscious visual 
stimuli  are  under  attentional  control  to  some  extent.  The  findings 
reviewed here are generally in line with refined theories of automa-
ticity (Moors & De Houwer, 2006; Naccache et al., 2002; Neumann, 
1990). They specifically support the notion of attentional sensitiza-
tion of processing pathways that enhances and attenuates automatic 
processing elicited by unconsciously perceived stimuli in congruency 
with task representations (Kiefer, 2007; Kiefer & Martens, 2010). We 
propose that processing can occur automatically in the sense that it 
does not depend on conscious awareness and that it is initiated without 
deliberate intention. However, automatic processing is susceptible to 
attentional top-down control and is only elicited if the cognitive system 
is  configured  accordingly.  Thus,  unconscious  automatic  processing 
and the notion of attentional control is not a contradiction as it has 
been previously thought (Maxfield, 1997; Pessoa et al., 2002; Posner & 
Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).
In the next section, we will show that seemingly paradoxical, hith-
erto unexplained findings in many cognitive domains regarding the 
automaticity of the underlying processes can be easily accommodated 
by our attentional sensitization model.
Attentional sensitization  
and the automaticity  
of cognition and emotion
Within the research of semantic processing, it has been argued that 
semantic processing is not automatic, but requires controlled access to 
conceptual meaning (Duscherer & Holender, 2002; Henik, Friedrich, 
Tzelgov, & Tramer, 1994). This is because semantic priming with con-
sciously perceived stimuli strongly depends on attentional orientation 
towards the prime word (for a review, see Deacon & Shelley-Tremblay, 
2000; Maxfield, 1997). Several studies found reduced or absent seman-
tic priming when the prime word was presented outside the focus of 
attention (Kellenbach & Michie, 1996; McCarthy & Nobre, 1993) or 
when participants were required to attend to perceptual letter fea-
tures of the prime (e.g., a letter search task) and not to its meaning 
(Chiappe, Smith, & Besner, 1996; Mari-Beffa, Valdes, Cullen, Catena, 
& Houghton, 2005). These findings are taken as evidence that access 
to conceptual meaning is confined to a controlled processing mode. 
However, several other studies demonstrating that unconsciously per-
ceived prime words can elicit semantic priming effects favor the view 
that semantic processing can also occur in an automatic fashion (Carr 
& Dagenbach, 1990; Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Kiefer, 2002; Kiefer 
& Spitzer, 2000; Rolke, Heil, Streb, & Henninghausen, 2001). This ap-
parent contradiction can be easily resolved if one assumes that even 
automatic processes depend on top-down control through attentional 
sensitization (Kiefer & Martens, 2010). According to our attentional 
sensitization model, semantic processing is automatic in the sense that 
it is involuntarily initiated even under unconscious viewing conditions. 
However, unconscious automatic processes are susceptible to atten-
tional modulation and are not invariantly triggered by the appropriate 
stimulus in a purely bottom-up fashion.
Similar  paradoxical  findings  regarding  the  automaticity  of  pro-
cesses have been reported in many other areas of psychology such as 
sensory-motor preparation (Bub & Masson, 2010), emotion (Pessoa 
et  al.,  2003),  and  cognitive  deficits  in  psychiatric  patients  (Kiefer, 
Martens, Weisbrod, Hermle, & Spitzer, 2009). Just to give an example: 
There is evidence that emotional stimulus information can be proc-
essed outside conscious awareness in an automatic fashion (Gaillard 
et al., 2006; Kemp-Wheeler & Hill, 1992; Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 
1998; Öhman & Soares, 1998). Other findings show, however, that 
emotional information is only accessed within a strategic processing 
mode: The typical increase of neural activity to emotional faces in 
the amygdala, a subcortical structure essentially relevant for assign-
ing emotional arousal to a stimulus, was abolished when a demand-
ing  secondary  task  strongly  depleted  attentional  resources  (Pessoa 
et  al.,  2002).  As  emotional  brain  activity  depends  on  attention,  it 
has  been  concluded  that  emotional  processing  is  not  automatic 
(Pessoa et al., 2003). Again, these seemingly discrepant findings of 
the automaticity of emotional processing can be accommodated by 
the  attentional  sensitization  model.  Our  framework  assumes  that 
automatic processes, similar to controlled processes, depend on an 
attentional amplification that sensitizes processing pathways. If a se-
condary task depletes attentional resources, the potential of an affec-
tive stimulus to automatically trigger an emotional response is reduced   
or abolished.
These examples demonstrate that the proposed attentional sen-
sitization model applies to many domains and has the explanatory 
power to account for seemingly conflicting empirical phenomena. If 
attentional sensitization of automatic processes is a general computa-
tional principle, the fascinating question arises whether it is possible to 
specifically enhance or attenuate broad classes of unconscious cogni-
tive and emotional processes in the healthy or patient population. For 
instance, future studies could assess whether implicit memory traces 
can be differentially influenced by the nature of previously activated 
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fear responses to phobia-relevant objects (such as spiders or snakes) 
can be attenuated in phobic patients, when the activated task repre-
sentation deemphasizes visual object recognition and/or includes a 
positive emotional state.
Our general experimental approach that combines a first task for 
inducing task sets with subsequent unconscious or conscious presenta-
tion of the critical stimulus would be an ideal tool for addressing these 
and related questions. The notion of attentional sensitization of uncon-
scious cognition could also help to explain and to further empirically 
investigate the modulatory effects of hypnotic inductions on automatic 
processes. A modulation of automatic processes by hypnosis has been 
reliably demonstrated for the Stroop interference effect (Stroop, 1935) 
that depends on a conflict between task-irrelevant automatic processes 
of word reading and task-relevant processes of color naming (Cohen, 
Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990). The Stroop interference effect is abo-
lished when participants receive the hypnotic suggestion that (English) 
color words should be conceived as meaningless character strings writ-
ten in an unknown alphabet (Raz et al., 2006; Raz, Moreno-Iniguez, 
Martin, & Zhu, 2007). The abolishment of the Stroop interference ef-
fect by hypnotic suggestion is particularly striking because the Stroop 
effect is considered to be a hallmark of automatic processing. Hence, 
our framework could contribute to a better understanding of the at-
tentional mechanisms underlying the effects of hypnosis in research 
and therapeutic settings.
conclusIon
The implicit top-down control of unconscious processing by atten-
tional sensitization reviewed in this article evidences the adaptability 
of the cognitive system in optimizing ongoing processing toward the 
pursuit of an intended goal: Task-relevant information is prioritized 
and task-irrelevant, possibly interfering influences are attenuated, both 
at a conscious and an unconscious level. The unconscious processing 
streams are thus under the control of higher-level attention to some 
extent.  The  proposed  attentional  sensitization  mechanism  operates 
in such a fashion as to considerably reduce the risk that unintended 
and not goal-related unconscious processes determine cognition and 
eventually influence behavior (Kiefer & Martens, 2010). 
Although much progress has been made to elucidate the attentional 
control mechanisms of unconscious visual perception, several open is-
sues crucially deserve further investigations:
 1. If the proposed attentional sensitization model is a general 
theory, it should also apply to other forms of unconscious pro- 
cesses such as visuo-spatial and emotional processing. In particu-
lar, conscious control of unconscious emotional processing is clini-
cally highly important because findings in this area might help to 
design more efficient therapeutic treatment techniques for mood 
and anxiety disorders. 
2. In order to gain more insight in the specificity of the attentional 
sensitization  mechanism,  it  is  necessary  to  compare  top-down 
control  of  subliminal  priming  with  a  variety  of  stimuli  (e.g., 
verbal and pictorial stimuli) within one and the same priming 
paradigm. The question arises whether or not processing of sub-
liminally presented pictures and words is boosted by the same task   
sets. 
3. Attentional control of unconscious visual perception was mainly 
investigated using the induction task paradigm or by manipulating 
action intentions. However, as the attentional sensitization model 
should also be valid for control settings established with other 
techniques, it would be highly interesting to investigate top-down 
control of unconscious cognition induced, for instance, by hypnotic 
suggestion (Raz et al., 2006) or by subliminal task cues (Mattler, 
2003; Reuss, Kiesel, Kunde, & Hommel, 2011). 
4. The assumption of the attentional sensitization model that con-
trol of unconscious processes is exerted by a prefrontal top-down 
signal, which in turn influences the sensitivity of processing path-
ways in posterior brain areas, should be tested in more detail by 
means of fMRI and electrophysiological recording techniques.
5. Finally, formal computational modeling of the proposed atten-
tional sensitization mechanism (see e.g., Trapp, Schroll, & Hamker, 
2012) is desirable to render our theory more precise and to derive 
further empirically testable predictions regarding the dynamics of 
attentional control of conscious and unconscious visual processing 
in various task domains.
In conclusion, the present review described striking evidence for 
implicit top-down control of unconscious processing by attentional 
sensitization.  We  demonstrated  that  preemptive  top-down  control 
of unconscious processes coordinates the processing streams in con-
gruency with higher-level task representations in various domains of 
cognition and emotion. Hence, attentional sensitization of automatic 
processing optimizes ongoing processing toward the pursuit of an in-
tended goal and ensures a high degree of flexibility and adaptability of 
the cognitive system in unconscious visual processing.
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